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1. Introduction 
T he problem of providing integrity to data stored in database systems has been a subject 
of interest among researchers for a number of 
years. In many cases the need to maintain the 
integrity of the data carried a higher priority than 
the need for information secrecy. Examples of such 
situations range from public medical information 
0167-4048/94/$7.00 © 1994, Elsevier Science Ltd 
to statistical results from public events (e.g. 
elections) which are publicly readable, but which 
can be modified only by authorized users. 
The most common method of ensuring integrity of 
data in a database is to use cryptographic checksums. 
A checksum is typically calculated on a piece of 
data (such as a database field entry or a record) as a 
function of some secret parameter which is avail-
able only to the authorized users. 
The notion of a cryptographic checksum has been 
embodied in the past within the concept of a data-
base filter which is to be located between the user 
and the database management system. From the 
point of view of the development of database 
security technology, the concept of a filter was 
perhaps one of the earliest to appear due to its 
simplicity. Given a database system to be protected, 
it was only natural to think initially of an inter-
mediary between the user and the database system, 
in the form of a filter that simply screens out data 
according to some policy for labelling data. 
One of the earliest realizations of the idea of a filter 
was the integrity lock approach, which was suggested 
initially by the us Air Force Summer Study on 
Multilevel Data Management Security in 1982 [1]. 
The notion of a 'spray paint' to label elements in 
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the database system was also suggested by the 
study. The integrity lock approach applied a check-
sum function to the contents of each record, and 
maintained this checksum for each record to detect 
illegal tampering by opponents who by-passed the 
filter. 
Ideally, the checksum should be a cryptographic 
hash function or encryption algorithm which is 
resistant to attacks based on cryptanalysis. The 
checksum is calculated whenever data is to be 
stored in the database system, and it is re-
computed and compared with the stored checksum 
to detect illegal changes since the last modification 
of the data. The data in the records are not 
encrypted, to allow record processing by the data-
base system, and the correct labelling of data 
remains the task of the filter. These checksums 
provide only error detection, not error correction. 
The use of checksums for data in database records 
has received attention, notably in the works of 
Denning (2-4] and Graubart et al. (S-7]. The work 
by Denning in [2] is significant because it identifies 
the granularity of the data to be protected, namely 
whole records, whole attributes or individual data 
elements. 
The other major work on the integrity lock 
approach was by Graubart [SJ, where it was applied 
to a commercial 'off-the-shelf' database manage-
ment system. The components of the integrity lock 
design in [5] are the Un trusted Front End (UTFE), 
the Trusted Front End (TFE) and the untrusted 
database management system. The UTFE performs 
query parsing and the formatting of output to the 
user. The TFE performs tasks such as user authen-
tication, tuple formatting, projections of data, and 
the calculations and verification of the checksums. 
The untrusted database system performs the usual 
tasks of record searching, tuple selection, insertion 
and deletion, and also database reconfiguration. 
The tuple in the database is left as plaintext for 
performance reasons, while the label and checksum 
are encrypted. As expected, the use of encryption 
expands the storage requirements of the database. 
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The implementation of the integrity lock design 
was done on the MISTRESS database management 
system running on the Unix operating system [7]. 
A description of the operating system support 
environment for the integrity lock approach is 
given by Graubart and Kramer [6]. 
In this paper we follow the direction taken by 
Denning [2] and Graubart [S] in the use of crypto-
graphic techniques to achieve record authentica-
tion. However, unlike these approaches which use 
symmetric or asymmetric cryptosystems to 
generate a checksum, our approach is based on the 
application of the concept of the sibling intractable 
function family (SIFF) which was first introduced 
by the work in [8]. 
In the previous approaches based on the use of 
cryptosystems a choice had to be made between a 
checksum for the entire record and a checksum for 
each data element in the record. The first method 
was advantageous in terms of space requirements, 
but resulted in the need to involve every data 
element in the record when the intention was to 
authenticate only one data element. The second 
method remedied this difficulty by creating a 
separate checksum for each data element in the 
record. In this way each data element could be 
authenticated independently of the other data 
elements, but the space requirements would be 
more than those for the first method. However, 
with today's rapidly decreasing cost of secondary 
storage the second method is becoming less 
intolerable. 
Our approach in the checksum calculation for 
plaintext (or enciphered) records is based on having 
a single checksum for each record. However, our 
approach allows each data element in the record to 
be authenticated independently of the others using 
the same record checksum. Another advantage lies 
in the flexibility of placing the description of the 
instances of SIFF associated with each record in the 
same storage as the records. This removes the need 
to have specialized secure storage which, in general, 
is several magnitudes higher in cost than the 
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ordinary secondary storage media. Finally, our 
approach allows the authentication of data 
elements without necessarily needing any secret 
cryptographic information. This compares 
favourably to Denning's approach whereby a secret 
encryption key must be used before any data 
element can be authenticated. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. In 
Section 2 the necessary definitions of the sibling 
intractable function family and of the pseudo-
random function family will be presented. This is 
followed by the use of the sibling intractable 
function family for record authentication in 
Section 3, and its further use for the generation of 
cryptographic keys in the case of the encipherment 
of the database in Section 4. The paper is closed by 
some remarks and conclusion in Section 5. 
2. Background in cryptography 
This section introduces two basic constructs for 
our database authentication scheme, namely, 
pseudo-random function families and sibling intractable 
Junction families (SIFF). 
Denote by .IV the set of all positive integers, n a 
security parameter, L the alphabet {O, I} and # 5 
the number of elements in a set S. By x E R 5 we 
mean that x is chosen randomly and uniformly 
from the set s. The composition of two functions J 
and g is defined as J og(x) =f(g(x)). Throughout the 
paper I and m will be used to denote polynomials 
from .IV to .IV. 
Let F= {Fnl n E.IV} be an infinite family of 
functions, where Fn= (f1j:LI(n)-> Lm(n)}. We call F 
a function family mapping I (n)-bit input to m(n)-
bit output string. F is polynomial time computable if 
there is a polynomial time algorithm (in n) com-
puting all J E F, and samplable if there is a probabil-
istic polynomial time algorithm that, on input 
n E.IV, outputs uniformly at random a description 
ofJEFn· 
Now, we introduce the definition of pseudo-
random functions [9] which will be applied in 
Section 3. Intuitively, F = {F n I n E.IV} is a pseudo-
random function family if, to a probabilistic poly-
nomial time algorithm, the output of a function J 
chosen randomly and uniformly from Fn , whose 
description is unknown to the algorithm, appears 
to be totally uncorrelated to the input of J, even if 
the algorithm can choose input for f The formal 
definition is described in terms of (uniform) statistical 
tests for functions. A (uniform) statistical test for 
functions is a probabilistic polynomial time 
algorithm A that, given n as input and access to an 
oracle 6'f for a functionj:LI(n)-> Lm(n), outputs a bit ° or 1. A can query the oracle only by writing on a 
special tape some yELI(n) and will read the oracle 
answer J(y) on a separate answer-tape. The oracle 
prints its answer in one step. 
Definition 1 Let F = {F n I n E.IV} be an infinite family 
of Junctions, where F n = {fl f:LI{n) -> Lm{n)}. Assume that 
F is both polynomial time computable and sa mpla ble. F is 
a pseudo-random function family iff,for any statisti-
cal test A, for any polynomial Q, and for all sufficiently 
large n, 
Ip~ - p~1 < lIQ(n) 
where p~ denotes the probability that A outputs 1 on 
input n and access to an oracle 6'ffor fERFn and p~ the 
probability that A outputs 1 on input n and access to an 
oracle 6' r for a Junction r chosen randomly and uniformly 
from the set oj all functions from LI(n) to Lm(n). The 
probabilities are computed over all the possible choices off, 
r and the internal coin tosses of A 
In [9], it has been shown that pseudo-random 
function families can be constructed from any 
pseudo-random string generators. By the result of 
[10, 11], the existence of anyone-way functions is 
sufficient for the construction of pseudo-random 
function families. 
The following definition of the collision accessibility 
property is presented because of its importance in 
the definition of sibling intractable function 
families. 
Definition 2. Let U = Un Un be a family of Junctions 
that is polynomial time computable, samplable, and maps 
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l(n)-bit input into m(n)-bit output strings. Let k be a 
fixed positive integer. U has the collision accessibility 
property if, for all nand for all 1:S; j:S; k, given any set 
X={x l , x2 ' ••• , x} of j initial strings in L1(n), it is 
possible in probabilistic polynomial time to select 
randomly and uniformly functions from U~, where 
U~ C Un is the set of all functions in Un that map x /J x 2, 
... , and Xj to the same strings in Lm(n). 
Now we are ready to introduce the notion of the 
sibling intractable function family. Let k = k(n) be a 
polynomial with k(n)~ 1 and H={HnlnEff}, 
where Hn={hlh:LI(n)---Lm(n)}, be an infinite family 
of functions that is polynomial time computable, 
samplable and has the collision accessibility 
property. Also le.t X = {Xl' X 2' ••• , xJ be a set of i 
initial strings in LI(n), where l:S;i:s;k, and h be a 
function in Hn that maps Xl' X 2' ... , Xj to the same 
string. Let F, called a siblingfinder, be a probabilistic 
polynomial time algorithm that, on input X and h, 
ourputs either "?" ("I cannot find") or a string 
X'ELI(n) such that x'tEX and h(x')=h(x
l
)= 
h(xz) = ... = h (xJ Informally, H is a k-sibling intract-
able function family, or k-SIFF for short, if, for any 
1 :s; i:s; k, for any sibling finder F, the probability 
that F ourputs an x' is negligible. More precisely: 
Definition 3. Let k = k(n) be a polynomial with 
k(n)~ 1 and H={HnlnEff} be afamily off unctions 
that is polynomial time computable, sa mpla b Ie, has the 
collision accessibility property and maps l(n)-bit input 
into m(n)-bit output strings. Let X = {x l' X 2, ••• , xJ 
be any set of i initial strings, where 1 :s;i:s;k. H is a 
k-sibling intractable function family, or simply 
k-SIFF, if,for each 1 :S;i:s;k,for each siblingfinder F,for 
each polynomial Q, and for all sufficiently large n, 
Pr{F(X, h) ~ ?} < lIQ(n) 
where h is chosen randomly and uniformly from 
H~ C Hn, the set of all functions in Hn that map x I' X 2' 
... , and Xi to the same strinf!.s in Lm(n), and the probability 
Pr{F(X, h) ~?} is computed over H~ and the sample 
space of all finite strings of coin flips that F could have 
tossed. 
576 
In [8] an explicit construction of SIFF from any 
one-way function was given. The reader is directed 
to [8] for other applications ofSIFF. 
3. Using SIFF to authenticate records 
Following [2], we will denote record i as having a 
record identifier R j and field (or attribute) j as 
having the field identifier F. The actual value of 
field j in record i is denoted as Xij' For simplicity, 
we assume that the security labels will be applied at 
the record level, incorporated into the record 
identifier R j • Hence, R j should be unique for each 
record and is assumed to contain enough informa-
tion to determine the security classification of the 
record. If security classification is to be applied at 
the data element level, then it is assumed that for 
each field F an additional field F j exists in the 
record which contains the security classification of 
data element Xij (see [2, 3]). We also assume that a 
key Kdb for the whole database exists, and is stored 
in a tamper-free condition. In the remainder of this 
paper we will use the term trusted party (TP) to 
denote a trusted agent which holds the secret 
cryptographic information necessary for the check-
sum generation and verification, and for the enci-
pherment and decipherment of data in the records. 
The trusted party can be an intermediary between 
the user and the database, or it can be a separate 
function in the database system. However, we will 
not be concerned any further with the acrual archi-
tecture of the system that incorporates the trusted 
party. 
The use of SIFF to calculate checksums for fields 
provides an alternative method for data integrity. 
The calculation of record checksums using SIFF 
has the major advantage of field checksums, 
namely that it allows a single checksum value to be 
associated with each record yet allows each data 
item to be authenticated independently of other 
data items in the record . 
3.1 Mathematical description 
Consider an (a + 1 )-SIFF, where a is an integer 
denoting the number of fields in each record i 
Computers & Security, Vol. 13, No. 7 
including the record identifier Ri and its security 
classification. We assume that every record follows 
this arrangement uniformly. The trusted party 
holds a secret information Sdb. In addition, it 
generates the key Kdb which is publicly readable in 
a tamper-free state. The public state of Kdb allows 
any party, trusted or otherwise, to verify that the 
data in the database is authentic. 
Let H = (Hn In Eff) be an (a + 1 )-SIFF mapping n-
bit input to n-bit output strings. Furthermore, 
assume that F=(FnlnEff} is a pseudo-random 
function family, where Fn={jKljK:L1(n)-L n, 
KELn) and each functionjKEFn is specified by an 
n-bit string K. Here we must have that 
IXijl + IRil + IFjl~1 (n), and padding (such as in [2]) 
can be used. 
For each record i we choose uniformly and 
randomly from Hn an instance ofSIFF hi such thar. 
h,(J,db(Ri II Sdb)) = hi(fKdb(Xil II Rill F1)) 
= ... = hi(!Kdb(Xia IIR"'Fa)) = Si (1) 
~ ~ 
............. 




Ri IISdb XilIlRi"Fi Xi2 11Ri llF2 
I I I 
where Si is a randomly chosen n-bit string, the 
checksum for record i. Here' II' denotes concatena-
tion. In this way the data element X ij (1 s;, j s;, a) can 
be authenticated when 
is satisfied. This process is shown in Fig. 1. 
3.2 Checking instances of SIFF 
Ideally, the description of the instances of SIFF hi 
should be placed in secure storage within the 
security perimeter of the trusted party. However, 
due to the large size of the description of these 
instances of SIFF a more manageable approach 
would be to store them in a 'shadow' database or 
together with the actual data in the database. In any 
case, the description of the instances h, of SIFF can 
be placed in a publicly readable storage since any 
modifications to them or to the checksums Si can 
be detected through the use of Sdb. That is, if hi of 
record i is modified illegally into h;, then using the 
false h; will not yield the correct checksum value, 





Fig. 1. Using SIFF for database authentication. 
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due to the fact that Sdb is secret. This is true even if 
the false h; yields the correct checksum for all the 
fields Fp Fz' ... , Fa: 
h:(fKdb(XilIIRiIIFI)) = h:(!Kdb(Xiz IIRil1 Fz)) 
= ... = h:(fKdb(XiaIIRiIIFa)) = Si 
If Si is modified illegally into 5; then the output of 
hi will not match the false 5;. This is shown in the 
following: 
Suppose that both hi and Si are illegally modified 
into h; and 5; respectively; theri, due to the partici-
pation of the secret Sdb' we still have that 
which indicates that the illegal modifications have 
occurred. 
The sibling intractable property of SIFF allows the 
detection by the trusted party of any illegal modifi-
cation to either or both of hi and Si. The secrecy of 
Sdb is necessary to ensure that only the trusted party 
can create Si through the selection of a suitable 
instance ofSIFF hi for record i. 
3.3 Field authentication 
The idea of maintaining a checksum for whole 
fields (or attributes) was also suggested by Denning 
[2, 3]. Similar to record checksums, an instance h 
) 
of a (/3 + 1 )-SIFF can be used for field checksums as 
follows: 
hj (f,db(F; II Sdb)) = h; (!Kdb(X I j IIRIII Fj)) 
= ... = hj (!Kdb(Xpj II Rpil Fj)) = Sj (2) 
where /3 is the number of records in the database. 
This approach, however, is impractical because the 
update of a value Xi; (1 ~ i ~ /3, 1 ~ j~ a) requires the 
involvement of all" the field values Xlj' XZj' ... , 
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Xf3j in the recalculation of the checksum Sj. This 
approach is more suitable to be applied to fields 
which are rarely changed, such as an employee'S 
name and birth date in the case of a company data-
base. 
3.4 Security of the database authentication scheme 
The record authentication scheme in eq. (1) can be 
considered secure if it is computationally difficult 
for an illegal user (or a trojan horse) to find the 
secret value Sdb even when the user knows K db , hi 
and Si. We will assume that the computational 
power of an illegal user or a trojan horse is 
bounded by probabilistic polynomial time. 
In more definite terms, we can say that for a data-
base with a total of /3 records, each having a differ-
ent instance Iz i of SIFF associated with it, the record 
authentication scheme is secure if, for any data 
element X,j in the database, for any polynomial Q, 
and for all sufficiently large n, the probability that 
an illegal user or a trojan horse can find Sdb using 
Kdb is less than I1Q(n). This also holds true when 
every record i in the database is given a different 
key K db, (i = 1, ... , /3) which are all known to the 
illegal user or the trojan horse. 
Now, the ability of an illegal user or a trojan horse 
to calculate Sdb is equivalent to that of predicting 
outputs of a pseudo-random function. This is a 
contradiction to the definition of pseudo-random 
function families. In fact, the ability of an illegal 
user or a trojan horse to obtain even the input 
string .L(Rillsdb) (or J,Jl)llsdb)) represents a 
further contradiction. Such an ability implies that 
the user or the trojan horse is able to invert or to 
find a collision string for the sibling intractable 
function family, both cases of which have a negli-
gible probability of happening. Hence, the database 
authentication scheme in eqs. (1) and (2) is secure 
provided that Sdb remains secret. 
4. Using SIFF to generate encipherment 
keys 
Independent, but related to the issue of database 
authentication, is the issue of protection of the 
Computers & Security, Vol. 13, No. 7 
database from illegal access. One possible method 
of preventing illegal access to records in the data-
base is by way of encipherment techniques. In 
simple terms, this involves the encipherment of 
records in the database using a cryptosystem that 
requires an encipherment key as one of its 
parameters. The database then consists of 
enciphered records which can be read or updated 
only through the use of the decipherment key 
(which may be different, but related, to the 
encipherment key). 
In the trusted party concept it is intended that a 
user should interact with the database through the 
trusted party, which on behalf of the user accesses 
the database, deciphers the retrieved records and 
presents the resulting plaintext records to the user. 
Records with fields of higher security classification 
than the user's security clearance can be filtered 
out, or the whole record can be suppressed from 
the user. Hence it is the task of a user to present 
some form of identification information to the 
trusted party, which then authenticates the user 
and retrieves the required data from the database 
depending on the user's security clearance. 
The simplest use of a SIFF in this simation is for it 
to derive the decipherment key by using the user's 
secret key or password as input to the instance of 
SIFF. Assume that there are P users having the 
secret keys Ku I' ... , Kup respectively. Furthermore, 
assume that KT is the secret key of the trusted 
party, haec is the instance of SIFF maintained as a 
secret by the trusted party, and Kdec is the decipher-
ment key. The trusted party must choose 
uniformly and randomly from Hn an instance haec 
of a P-SIFF such thac 
hacJAT(KT )) = hacc(!KT(Ku)) 
= ... = hacc(!KT(Kup)) = Kdec (3) 
Note that here Kdec should never be visible or 
accessible to the users. Hence its derivation must be 
a guarded privilege of the trusted party. The 
enciphered records are then retrieved by the 
trusted party and deciphered using Kdec within the 
security bounds of the trusted party. 
This simple idea using SIFF, as expressed in eq. (3), 
can be extended further to the multilevel case 
where users are grouped according to their security 
clearances, each group having access to a subset of 
the database depending on the security clearance. , 
5. Conclusion 
An alternative approach to the authentication of 
databases has been the topic of research in this 
paper. The approach is realized in a scheme which 
is based on pseudo-random functions and the 
sibling intractable function family (SIFF). The 
security of the scheme has been shown to be 
equivalent to predicting the output of pseudo-
random functions and inverting the sibling intract-
able function family, both of which have a small 
probability of occurring. 
The scheme, which has been discussed in the con-
text of the concept of the trusted party that acts as 
an intermediary between the user and the database, 
allows each record to be associated with one check-
sum which can be used to verify the authenticity of 
one data element within the record independently 
from other data elements. The scheme also has the 
advantage that it requires only a small amount of 
information to be maintained secret, which is 
something affordable for the trusted party. Related 
to this is the advantage that the description of the 
instances of SIFF can be placed in the same storage 
area as the records of the database and their 
associated checksums. In this way no secure storage 
needs to be assigned for the maintenance of the 
instances of SIFF arid the checksums. The scheme is 
also suitable for the generation of encipherment 
(and decipherment) keys in enciphered databases to 
allow only legal access to the database. 
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